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Abstract 
 
This article analyses the forced labour system created in Spain during the Civil 
War and maintained during the Francoist dictatorship, paying special attention 
to the economic logic that led the state and private enterprises to draw a profit 
from this kind of punishment. In order to deal with this question in depth my 
research has been focused on three main aspects: the workforce supply in a war 
economy and in a context of reconstruction, the margins of profit produced by 
this kind of labour in comparison with free labour, and the problems related to 
productivity levels. Through consideration of these questions I present an 
overview of the main research in the subject and make suggestions for new 
goals in Spanish economic history concerned with this kind of repressive 
practice, bringing it into line with international historiography on the forced 
labour economy. 
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“Putting the pickaxe to the road. 
 Some broke up the stone, others removed the earth with a shovel, 
 And others took it to the quarry’s edge in a cart, 
 Some days they assigned extra work to us, 
And whoever did not finish his task had to go back at night with a sentry, 
Aiming at him there, so that he would finish it” 
     
 
 
Andrés Millán, forced labourer on mountain roads in the Pyrenees1 
 
 
 
1. New Perspectives on Spanish Historiography on Forced Labour 
During the last five years historiography on forced labour in Spain has undergone a 
great development. In fact, until then this matter had remained almost completely absent from 
research or synthesis on the civil war or the Francoist repression, and its conceptualisation and legal 
framework has even given rise to historiographical and judicial arguments. Besides this, historians 
have had to resolve special difficulties concerning documentation, such as access to military 
archives or those of the Justice Ministry2. However, during recent years some important research 
                                                 
1 A. Millán was one of the 6th BDST working battalion prisoners from July 1940 to December 1942. He worked in a 
small village of Navarre from July 1940 to June 1941. Oral interview recorded in 2003, March 3 (Mendiola and 
Beaumont, 2006: 162). 
2 One of the most important experts on this question for Nazi Germany, Spoerer (2004: 253), underlined that a good 
deal of research about German companies has resulted from  recent indemnification litigations on forced labourers. 
In Spain, on the contrary, the legal invisibility of this kind of punishment and the legal restrictions for historians to 
consult public or company archives (Espinosa, 2006: 121 - 134) are closely related to the late development of this 
kind of historiography. For the legal conceptualisation of forced labour in recent Spanish legislation on historical 
memory, see Mendiola (2006b). Following some memorial (Llarch, 1975) or journalistic (Sueiro, 1976; Lafuente, 
2002) publications, attention must be drawn to the research by Rodrigo (2005 and 2007), Acosta et al., (2005), 
Mendiola and Beaumont (2006) and Gómez (2008), which are pioneering works on the different modalities of 
forced labour in Franco's Spain. Another important goal for the historiography of forced labour is the creation of 
specific archives or documentary centres on this punishment modality, as can be found in Germany (the most 
important of which is the project “ Zwangsarbeit 1939 – 1945 / Forced Labor 1939 – 1945" with more than 600 
interviews with former forced labourers under Nazi Rule,  http://www.zwangsarbeit-archiv.de/en/index.html. A 
specific archive about IG Farben has been created by Memorial Wollheim,  http://www.wollheim-
memorial.de/en/home). In Spain, the projects underway, although very interesting, are still far removed from this 
reality. The most important project is Memorial Merinales (Acosta, 2008), and also the website 
www.esclavitudbajoelfranquismo.org (created by the Memoriaren Bideak association and the Geronimo de Uztariz 
Social and Economic History Institute, in Spanish, Basque and English), where we can find some research projects, 
documentary films, and also private memories or autobiographies of forced labourers. About the importance of these 
kinds of project and its historiographical relevance, see Mendiola (2009 and 2010b). 
 3 
 
 
has been carried out, and we are now in a position to introduce Spanish historiography into the main 
discussions about the contemporary history of forced labour, and to compare the Spanish case with 
some other forms of forced labour in twentieth century Europe, mainly with Nazi Germany3. Some 
international comparative efforts have already been made to understand the organization and 
operation of concentration camps, mainly by J. Rodrigo (2010), but if we want to understand the 
economic logic of forced labour we must go further, because in Spain the concentration camps were 
not a place for a long sojourn, but a kind of way station where prisoners of war were classified and 
then sent on to different destinations. Thus, although most of the forced labourers remained inside 
the administrative structure of the Concentration Camps during the war and in the post-war period 
up until 1942, the places where the work battalions themselves were stationed cannot strictly be 
considered concentration camps; instead they resembled stars and planets in what David Rousset 
called the concentration universe.  
This obliges us to tackle the interrelation between the two main purposes of forced 
labour, the economic and the political, and also to deal in depth with the economic logic of that kind 
of punishment, taking into account some of the most important elements in the configuration of 
labour markets and business strategies, such as the workforce supply-demand relationship, the 
extraction of capital gains from the work, and the level of productivity of tasks carried out by forced 
labourers. In this way, we must insert the Spanish experience within the European discussions about 
relationships between business enterprises and fascist regimes, in which the deployment of forced 
labour has been one of the most important points of debate4.  
Historiography on the great forced labour system in fascist Europe, that of Nazi 
                                                 
3 First of all, we have to deal with the difficulty of defining forced or unfree labour (Brass, 1997 and 1999). 
Discussion amongst scholars is not closed, and some of them even consider that there is no point in drawing a clear 
dividing line between free and “unfree” labour (Steinfeld y Engerman, 1997). In any case, most of the experts on the 
question underline some basic characteristics of forced labour, mainly the incapacity of the worker to sell his or her 
own labour power on the labour market (Brass, 1999: 57). The debate has continued up to today, and we also have to 
deal with new debates about work in prison and other forms of forced labour in the present day (ILO, 2009). In any 
case, historiographical discussion has underlined that research on forced labour must be understood within research 
on the formation of labour markets and within relationships between free and unfree labour in capitalist 
development, as has been pointed out by Linden (1997b: 501 - 523), Brass (1997: 71 - 75 and 1999: 145 - 165), 
Moulier-Boutang (2006: 49 - 101) or Buggeln (2008: 127 – 129).  
4 Some general outlooks can be found in the works by Herbert (1997), James and Tanner (2002), Hayes (2002), 
Andreassi (2004), Spoerer (2005), or Plumpe (2005). The case of Italian fascism is different, because it did not 
develop the systematic deployment of prisoners (Andreassi, 2004; Segreto, 2002). In the case of Franco's Spain, it 
must be underlined that the deployment of war captives or imprisoned persons has been completely absent from the 
agenda of the research of economic historians on the war economy and business strategies. Indeed, almost nothing 
about it appears in some of the most important compilations and syntheses on the economy and business in this 
period (Sánchez Recio and Tascón, 2003; Fuentes Quintana, 2009; Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruíz, 2006; Cabrera 
and Del Rey, 2002), with the exception of González Portilla and Garmendia (1998: 113-115) and Gálvez (2006: 
487).  
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Germany, has focused on different questions, such as its role in shaping the labour market or the 
degree of willingness of enterprises to gain profit from forced labour. While some historians, like 
Roth (1997), understand the deployment of forced labour within the changes in class relationships 
in the fascist regime before the war, and therefore as a structural measure for ensuring the new 
economic policy, some others, like Herbert (1997, 2000), emphasise that the forced labour program 
can only be understood within the logic of the war economy, and thus as a dynamic and 
circumstantial measure, which goes beyond and is even contrary to the Nazi economic program5. 
Focusing especially on ethnic policy, Gruner (2006) underlines the fact that forced labour had a 
special place amongst the measures against the Jewish population from 1938 onwards, long before 
the extermination measures started in 1942.  
On the other hand, a parallel debate concerns the degree of willingness shown by 
enterprises towards the deployment of forced labourers. According to Spoerer (2005), and in part 
contrary to Herbert's opinion, German companies had very narrow margins of manoeuvre if they 
wanted to survive in a war context. This historian remarks on the need for analysing the strategies 
of German enterprises according to economic logic, mainly cost-benefits analysis, within a very 
special context. Hayes agrees with the need to deal with the complexity of the matter, but observes 
that most German businessmen “increased the need for such workers and worsened the conditions 
they were forced to suffer” (Hayes, 2002: 34)6. 
Although further research will be needed to deal with this subject in depth, the main 
objective of this paper is to analyse these questions and to indicate some conclusions that will help 
us proceed further, starting from some of the forced labour sectors that are better known today, 
sectors that present a significant variety of situations and company strategies. The first of these is a 
leading sector of the Spanish economy, the mining and steel industry in the Basque Country; the 
second is the huge plan to open up mountain roads in the Pyrenees mountain range; and the third, 
civilian work on the railway infrastructure7. Thus, answering the challenge of Nicolás Sánchez 
                                                 
5 In fact, both approaches understand the dynamic nature of forced labour, linked to workforce shortages, in the case 
of Herbert (1997: 383 - 396), or to changing social relations, in the case of Roth. This historian emphasizes the 
concept of subproletarianisation (Roth, 1997: 127 - 143), closely related to that of deproletarianisation, proposed by 
Brass for understanding the use of forced labour in capitalist agrarian contexts (Brass,  1997: 71 – 74, and 1999: 158 
- 164).  
6 For Daimler-Benz, Gregor (1998: 216) remarks that the “resort to exploitation was not only a product of rational 
company choice” and had to be understood within “the normalization of this culture of barbarism”. 
7 For the Basque mining and steel industry, see González Portilla and Garmendia (1988), Pastor (2010) and Mendiola, 
(2010a); for the railway infrastructure, see Olaizola (2006), Quintero (2009a) and Mendiola (2011); for mountain 
roads see Mendiola and Beaumont (2006 and 2007) and Mendiola (2010a). 
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Albornoz, it is time for economic historians to deal with the economic logic of forced labour8. For 
this purpose we will have to answer some questions: the extent to which it was related to workforce 
supply problems; what kinds of profits it gave to private enterprises and the state; and what were the 
reasons, related to productivity levels, that led some enterprises to decide to continue with this 
system after 1940, while some others asked for the replacement of forced labourers with free ones.  
The main goal of this paper is to help in answering all these questions, but, in any 
case, before trying to deal with them, it is necessary to present a brief overview of the way that kind 
of punishment was organized. 
2. Organization of the Forced Labour System 
After World War I discussions on forced labour in Europe were closely related to war 
policy and the evolution of criminal law. On the one hand, the experience of World War I showed 
that forced labour, although it involved some organizational and productive problems, could help 
solve some of the labour needs of the countries at war9. On the other hand, specialists on penal 
history have remarked that the triumph of the prison as the most important form of punishment in 
the contemporary age almost resulted in the disappearance in Europe of the old image of prisoners 
working on several tasks, but this did not completely suppress the idea of work as a “correctional” 
instrument for imprisoned persons10. Within this context, Oliver (2007) suggests that we can talk of 
some kind of “reinvention of punitive utilitarianism” to define the way in which the Francoist 
                                                 
8 Sánchez Albornoz (2003: 1089), one of the most prestigious Spanish economic historians, underlined that it is time 
for economic historians to do research on forced labour  in a text where he analyses the construction of a fascist 
memorial monument, the so-called Valle de los Caídos monastery. In fact, he was one of the thousands of antifascist 
prisoners that worked there. More information about this construction and the work of prisoners there can be found 
in the books by Sueiro (1976) and Olmega (2009). 
9 Since Davis's (1977) pioneering study pointed out the importance of prisoners of war in a war economy, several 
historians have studied this matter in depth. During World War II almost every country made use of them, although 
undoubtedly it was Japan and Germany that established larger systems (Spoerer, 2002: 170). In the German case, 
Herbert (1997: 13 - 26) has underlined the importance of the experience of World War I for the deployment of 
forced labour during World War II.  Besides, the government of the Spanish II Republic also started deploying 
prisoners in work camps during the Spanish Civil War (Ruiz, 2009). 
10 For a classic explanation about the making of the modern prison and punishment, and the abolition of former kinds 
of punishment, such as different kinds of labour, see Foucault (1994). Nonetheless, in some countries, like many 
southern states in the USA,  the leasing of prisoners to private enterprises was not forbidden until 1908. Later on, in 
any case, the so-called “chain gang” was essential for the development and improvement of rural roads there 
(Lichtenstein, 1996). For the evolution of German prisons during the Weimar Republic in Germany,  see 
Wachsmann (2004: 17 -64). Within a very different penal tradition, the nascent USSR used forced labour from the 
very beginning, (Gregory and Lazarev, 2004; Linden, 1997a). In Spain the liberal penal system maintained some 
kinds of tasks for prisoners during the nineteenth century, but this had almost fallen out of use by the start of the 
twentieth century (Burillo, 1999: 203 - 247; Oliver, 2007: 20-26). The colonial territories were, in any case, a 
significant exception. In Cuba an important discussion took place on the profitability of slavery up until 1880, and 
Spain  was, in fact, one of the last countries to abolish this kind of labour (Piqueras, 2002). On the other hand, in 
Guinea, the Spanish rulers established in the early twentieth century the so called “prestaciones”, in order to ensure 
native labour for opening up roads or carrying different commodities (Nerín. 2008: 71 – 78).  
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regime combined a new rhetorical discourse (appealing to the Catholic concept of the redemption of 
sin) and old punitive practices to justify the creation of a forced labour network during the civil war 
and in the post-war years. 
This forced labour system must be understood within the changing context of 
political repression carried out by the Francoist government during the war11. In fact, it was not 
until the spring of 1937 when this system was organized12. This was closely related to the change in 
the political and strategic use and organization of repression at the beginning of 1937, when the 
perspective of a long war replaced that of a swift and forceful coup d’etat, while the number of 
prisoners of war was increasing every week, mainly with the Francoist advance on the Northern 
front. Thus, at this precise moment we can note an important effort to organize the repression. This 
involved abandoning the indiscriminate killings without trial, which were replaced by military trials 
and a classification of prisoners of war according to political criteria, based on the reports made by 
local authorities about them13.  
Thus, it is in the spring of 1937 when several legal rules on forced labour were 
established. The first of these was the so-called decree on the “concession of the right to work to 
prisoners and prisoners of war” (25th March, 1937), which spelt out the way for the two most 
important varieties of work in captivity: one involving imprisoned people, related to the Justice 
Ministry, and the other involving prisoners of work battalions, which depended on the new legal 
structure of the concentration camps, the so-called  ICCP (Inspección de Campos de Concentración 
de Prisioneros - Concentration Camp Inspectorate for Prisoners of War), where prisoners of war 
were classified according to their political or trade union activity14. In that same year, 1937, the first 
                                                 
11 In the German case, war is also the key to understanding the great development of forced labour. In any case, this 
should not lead us to forget that different kinds of forced labour were put into practice before the war, such as the 
Reich Labour Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst) for unemployed people (Roth, 1997: 131 - 132; Herbert, 1997: 32 -33), 
the SS camps (Jaskot, 2000: 13 - 34; and Allen, 2002: 57-78 ), the segregated labour deployment for Jews (Gruner, 
2006: 5-8), or prison labour (Wachsmann, 2004: 95 - 106). 
12 In any case, during the first months of the war we can find evidence of the use of informal and not legally ruled 
forced labour as a kind of punishment for the so-called “guvernative” (preventive) prisoners in jail (Vega, 2005a: 
184, 486).  
13 Around 100,000 persons were killed behind the lines during the war and some 40,000 more after the war. The main 
trends and data of repression can be consulted in the works by Rodrigo (2008) and Espinosa, (2010: 77 - 78). 
Although thousands of captives died or were killed working, this political extermination mostly occurred outside the 
forced labour system. 
14 For detailed research on the Spanish concentration camps, see Rodrigo (2003 and 2005). In Germany there was also 
a plurality of forms of forced labour, with the concentration camps, controlled by the SS, prisoner-of-war camps, 
mainly controlled by the army, the Wehrmacht, and prisons under the civilian justice administration also (Herbert, 
2002; Spoerer and Fleischhacker 2002a). Here the Concentration Camps Inspection was created in 1934, under the 
control of the SS, with exactly the same name as later in Spain, Inspektion der Konzentrationslager (Wachsmann, 
2010: 124).  
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forced labour battalions (Batallones de Trabajadores - Workers’ Battalions) were created, which 
included those prisoners of war who were neither released nor sent to jail for a military trial. Thus, 
this modality of forced labour, the most important during the war and in the post-war period, was 
organized for prisoners of war classified as “Desafectos” (hostile to the régime) or “Adictos 
dudosos” (of questionable loyalty to the fascist regime). These battalions were dissolved in 1940, 
one year after the war finished, and reorganized with half of their members, the youngest, who were 
incorporated into the new BDST (Batallones Disciplinarios de Soldados Trabajadores – 
Disciplinary Battalions of Worker-Soldiers). On the other hand, in 1938 the new Justice Ministry 
founded the Sistema de Redención de Penas por el Trabajo (System of Punishment Redemption 
through Work), created for men and women in jail, which could theoretically shorten their time in 
captivity thanks to work. Thus, with all these measures, the Francoist government created the legal 
framework for forced labour during the war and the post-war period15.  
The main aim of these kinds of work was double, as emerges in almost all the 
measures mentioned: the economic purpose of obtaining a profit from people in captivity, and the 
political purpose of preparing them to live in a dictatorial context16. The second article of the 
Battalions Regulation is a good example of this double aspect, where the main aims are described  
as mixing economic purposes (compensation for prisoners’ maintenance and reparation for war 
damages) with the “correction of the prisoner”: 
That of achieving the correction of the prisoner, providing him with the means and occasion to 
demonstrate his intentions and at every moment his degree of moral, patriotic and social 
rehabilitation, acquiring the habit of deep discipline, prompt obedience and respect for authority, 
precisely and very specially at work, as the prior and indispensable basis of his adaptation to the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
15 The organization of the concentration camps during war and the classification of prisoners have been studied in 
depth by Rodrigo (2003 and 2005). Subsequent research by Barriuso (2006), Mendiola and Beaumont (2006), 
Monfort (2009) and Mathews (2010) has focused on the formation of Labour Battalions (BB.TT.). Post-war 
battalions (BDST) and the characteristics of their prisoners have been explained in depth by Beaumont and 
Mendiola (2004) and Mendiola and Beaumont (2006 and 2008). The special case of BDST (P) can be consulted in 
López Jiménez (2003). For the System of Punishment Redemption through Work, see mainly (Acosta et al., 2005) 
and Gómez (2008). Concerning this system there is also interesting research by Roldán (1988: 183 – 199), Cenarro 
(2003), Prada and Rodríguez (2003),  Heredia (2006), and Quintero (2009b). In fact, although with important 
changes and in a declining way, work in prison was maintained under the System of Punishment Redemption 
created in 1938 until the change in the Penal Code in 1996. After the so-called Destacamentos Penales were 
cancelled in the sixties (Quintero, 2009b) and the Militarised Penitential Colonies Service in 1960 (Acosta et al, 
2005: 94 - 101), prisoners work was made inside prisons, with several Prisons Workshops (Lorenzo Rubio, 2010 and 
2011: 160 - 163).    
16 This political purpose, in an agrarian and theoretical context, is also remarked upon by Brass (1997: 71 – 74, and 
1999: 158 - 164), with the concept of deproletarianization, or by Roth, who includes forced labour amongst the 
variety of policies included in a process of “un-making” the German working class before World War II (Roth: 
1997: 129 – 134).  
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social environment of the New Spain17.  
 
Figure 1. Quantity and modalities of forced labour under Francoism during the war and in the 
post-war period  
 
Source: Mendiola and Beaumont, 2006: 70 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the total number of those involved in forced labour 
increased during the war and reached its peak (108,781) at the beginning of 1940, one year after the 
war ended, when prisoners of war battalions were still working, and the System of Punishment 
Redemption for people in jail continued to grow. After this time, this kind of repression evidently 
lost importance, with the dissolution of the post-war battalions (BDST) in December 1942, and the 
decline of prison labour from 1943 onwards. Thus, it is clear that most of the work was organized 
and carried out during the war, and that most of the forced labourers were included in the extra-
judicial sphere, working in battalions that depended directly on the concentration camp structure18. 
                                                 
17 “Reglamento Provisional para el Régimen Interior de los Batallones de Trabajadores”, approved by Franco on 
December 23, 1938 (AGMA, CGG, 2, 155, 16). This double purpose, political and economic, also appears in other 
laws or decrees, such us the System of Punishment Redemption through Work (Boletín Oficial del Estado -BOE-, 
1938, October 11) or the Militarised Penitential Colonies Service (BOE, 1939, September 17). 
18 These two essential characteristics have also been described for Nazi Germany (Roth, 1997: 130 - 137; Herbert, 
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Nevertheless, once the war was over and the concentration camp directorate dissolved, forced 
labour did not end, but remained as a special kind of punishment for imprisoned persons. 
If we analyse the data in Table 1, we can see what the use of work in captivity 
represented for the war economy19. Thanks to these figures, we can conclude that approximately 
half of the prisoners were posted to military tasks, mainly fortresses and service corps. The other 
half, on the contrary, was mainly used for transport infrastructure (roads, railway, bridges..) or for 
the reconstruction of civilian buildings in towns and villages, that is, construction tasks that, while 
many were related to war needs, had their own influence on the civilian economy after the war.  
 
Table 1.  Kind of work carried out by prisoners of war in December 1938. 
 prisoners % 
Airports 2333 2.7
Railway infrastructure 6206 7.1
Mountain trails and roads 23530 26.9
Bridges 1463 1.7
Industry 1580 1.8
Mining industry 1320 1.5
Forestry works 298 0.3
Urban reconstruction  2064 2.4
TOTAL PUBLIC WORKS, MINING & INDUSTRY 38794     44.3 
Fortresses 17797 20.3
Service corps and other military tasks 16691 19.1
Vehicles and war material recovery 6426 7,3
TOTAL MILITARY WORKS 40914     46.7 
Unknown    7781      8.9 
 TOTAL 87489 100 
Source:  AGMA, CCG, 1, 46bis, 8 and AGMA, CCG, 1, 46bis, 9. 
 
But this undoubtedly changed after the end of the war, when a lot of battalions were 
moved to the Pyrenees, and many of them started working on mountain roads20. Thus, although it is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2000; and Spoerer and Fleischhacker, 2002a). 
19 This table has been elaborated using the only two exact reports on the situation of every workers’ battalion during 
the war, in December 1938 and January 1939. The situation could change from month to month, but I think this kind 
of “snapshot” provides us with a good approach to the distribution of prisoners of war at work. Even with such an 
exact list, we can see that the localisation of almost 9 % of prisoners was unknown.  
20 Exact data on the work done by each battalion in the Western Pyrenees and the respective dates can be found in 
Mendiola (2010a: 14 - 15). For the Eastern Pyrenees, see Clara (2007), Dueñas (2008), and Monfort (2009). 
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impossible for the time being to produce a table for the exact distribution of workers in the early 
1940s, it can be said that the great majority worked on construction tasks, such as urban 
reconstruction, railways or hydrological infrastructure, such as reservoirs or irrigation channels, the 
Lower Guadalquivir Channel for example21. 
 
3. Workforce Supply and Demand  
Although the forced labour system was maintained and continued to grow after the 
war, there is no doubt that the birth of this kind of repression must be understood within the context 
of the war economy, at a time when the exceptional situation and the need of an efficient use of 
production factors led the fascist authorities to ensure the work force supply, within a general 
economic strategy of large-scale mobilization directed by the state, a kind of monopolistic 
capitalism in which the state is one of the main suppliers of labour power22. As a matter of fact, the 
war had a direct impact on the quantity and quality of the workforce, not only during war, but also 
during the post-war years, as has been pointed out by several historians like Nuñez (2003), Martín 
Aceña (2006) or Prados de la Escosura and Roses (2009a and 2009b)23. Thus, one of the purposes 
of forced labour during the war was to supply the necessary workers so that strategic and militarised 
factories could keep on producing, and in the same way the state itself could obtain the necessary 
workforce for civilian or military tasks24.    
If we consider figure 2, we can see that the percentage of prisoners in the workforce 
was closely related to the war economy, although it never represented an important factor for 
ensuring global production during the war or in the post-war period, as happened in Germany, 
where different modalities of forced labourers reached around 40% of the total work force in 1942 - 
194525. In any case, so as to better understand the economic logic of this kind of punishment, in 
                                                 
21 Acosta et al (2005: 43 – 49 and 65 – 75) have published a huge list of the works carried out within the System of 
Punishment Redemption after the war, but the authors observe that it needs to be completed with new documents 
that are not yet available. For the BDST, Mendiola and Beaumont (2006: 99 - 100) provide information about their 
location in 1942, but at present it is  not possible to determine the exact task of each of them.  
22 E. San Román (1999: 89 - 139) stresses that this kind of military organisation of the economy acquired importance 
in Europe during World War I, and that it was favourably viewed by some sectors of Spanish army. 
23 Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009b: 27) have calculated the sharp decline in the total quantity of labour during 
the war and its rise in the early 1940s until 1943, when the total figure remains relatively stable until the start of the 
next decade.  
24 In the regulations for the deployment of prisoners, we can appreciate that sometimes there was some competition to 
obtain a profit from these workers, which made the state lay down some rules about what kind of tasks would be 
carried out by prisoners. In 1938, when the Redemption System was created, the 6th Article was clear about this 
question: “petitions for work by the State, the Provincial or the Local Councils will be chiefly attended to” (BOE 11 
octubre 1938, 103, pg. 174) 
25 More than 7 million forced workers in 1944 were deployed in different branches of the German economy with 
several legal statuses.  The main global figures on forced labourers, their classification and their percentage out of 
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figures 2 and 3 we have completed global percentages for those of two provinces and three 
economic sectors that have been researched in depth, and we can see that global trends must be 
understood according to the needs of specific sectors, such as mines, industry or construction26. 
Figure 2. Percentage of forced labourers over active population (December 1940)27 
 
Source: Data on forced workers in Biscay and Navarre (Mendiola, 2010), data on forced workers in Spain: Figure 1. 
Data on active population in December 1940, Census data.  
First of all, we must underline the importance of prisoners in the restructuring of 
Basque iron mining after the fall of Biscay to the Francoist army in June 1937. At that precise 
moment it was of strategic importance for the military government to ensure a fast growth of 
production in mines and factories, and the shortage of workers, especially skilled ones, is mentioned 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the total workforce have been calculated by Herbert (1997, 2000), Roth (1997: 132, 137), and Spoerer and 
Fleischhacker (2002a). In the end, there was a growing and essential contradiction between the needs of the war 
economy and racial policy, with important tension developing between an economically oriented sector (headed by 
Speer, Minister of Armaments and Industry from February 1942) and some other leaders of the Nazi party (mainly 
the Security Head Office, RSHA), which did not like the massive use of foreign workers inside Germany, mainly 
from 1942 onwards; this has been emphasized by Gregor, who explains “the growing incompatibility of productivist 
and racist goals” (1998: 165), Hayes (1987: 319-320), Herbert (1997: 387 – 389), Kotkin (2000: 187 – 189), 
Mazower (2008: 395 - 427), and Buggeln (2009: 620-625), who remarks the need of researching the economic logic 
of subcamps. See also Speer´s own explanation (1969: 439 - 454) 
26 For a detailed description of the use of forced labour in the different Basque sectors, see Mendiola, (2010a). 
27 Logically, exact data on the active population for every year is not available. So I have used that of December 1940 
(census data) to calculate percentages. This approach, surely the best that can be made at present, does not take into 
account changes in the active population from year to year, mainly for the war period, when these forced labourers 
were only located in the regions occupied by Franco´s army.  
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as an important problem, together with the mention of prisoners as the best means for resolving it28. 
In any case, we must bear in mind that the deployment of prisoners of war in these iron mines did 
not reach even one-third of the projected figures. Furthermore, what was to be an important 
experiment for the running of coal mines in another province, Asturias, did not find any meaningful 
continuity there29.  
Figure 3. Percentage of prisoners over sectors (active male population) 
Source: Mendiola, 2010. 
 
Although a shortage in the workforce was reported as one of the main problems of 
the iron industry in Biscay following its occupation by the fascist faction, the big factories did in 
fact manage to increase their personnel with a very low percentage of forced labourers. In fact, in 
contrast to mining, where most of the employed prisoners had no previous qualification in that kind 
                                                 
28 For the workforce shortage in Basque industry and mines after the fascist occupation and the help given by 
entrepreneurs to the new authorities, see González Portilla and Garmendia (1988: 101 – 133), Pastor (2010: 25 - 32) 
and Mendiola, (2010a).  
29 Apart from the battalion that worked in the mines in Biscay, only one other was formed during war, BB.TT. 2, 
stationed in Peñarroya (Córdoba) (AGMA, CCG, 1, 46bis, 9.). After the war, more than one thousand forced 
labourers worked in mines in Albacete, Burgos, Ciudad Real, Asturies, León, Lleida, Murcia, Ourense, Pontevedra 
and Teruel (Acosta et al., 2005: 65 – 74; Terrón, 2007, and Rodriguez Teijeiro, 1999). Nonetheless, the percentages 
of captive workers in mines are much lower than in mining in the Rhur in Germany, where almost one-third of the 
workers were unfree (Herbert, 1997: 240). 
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of work, the presence of captive workers in Basque industry has to be understood as a selective 
strategy that was aimed at obtaining qualified workers who were difficult to find on the labour 
market30.   
The shortages in the workforce in Basque mines and industries is closely related to 
another important factor in the composition of labour markets, that is, gender values and women’s 
participation, something that has been underlined by the historiography on forced labour in 
Germany. In fact, although some enterprises asked for women to fill the gap in the workforce due to 
the recruitment of young males, the Nazi regime ruled out this way of solving the problem, mainly 
because it was afraid of the problems that might arise in family life and in volunteer social 
services31. In Biscay, and nowhere else in Spain as far as we know, there is no mention of the 
possibility of solving the problem with the deployment of women, something that would have gone 
against gender values enforced by the new regime32.  
Another special branch of activity where there was a serious problem of lack of 
workers was in the railway infrastructure. In the context of the war, both the maintenance of already 
existing railways and the opening of double tracks were essential for the mobilization of military 
units33. In this situation, the lack of workers was an important problem, mainly for ensuring the 
availability of railway infrastructure as soon as possible, a problem that was in large measure solved 
                                                 
30 In fact, the percentage of captive workers was quite low even for the industries in which prisoners were deployed. In 
Biscay the enterprise that deployed most prisoners was S.E. Construcción Naval Astilleros de Sestao y Nervión, 
with 229 forced labourers, some 13.4% of the workforce (Mendiola, 2010a: 14). Nonetheless, in the case of smaller 
factories, lower figures may be indicative of a greater dependence on forced labour crucial for the survival of the 
enterprise, and further research will be needed. For general trends in Spanish industrial production during the civil 
war, see Catalán (2009). As pointed out, percentages were much higher in German industries (Herbert, 1997: 205 – 
238). 
31 The importance of gender values has been noted by several historians, analyzing the opposed opinions on this of 
enterprise managers, who were asking for German women, and the Nazi government, which was wary about its 
consequences (Herbert, 1997: 387 -392; Gregor, 1998: 153 – 156; Hayes, 341-342). Paradoxically, in 1942, the 
Justice Ministry requested that imprisoned women should carry out the same tasks as men (Walchsmann: 2004: 
231).   
32 In Spain, prison labour for women was based on gender values (Fernández Holgado and Gastón, 1997: 110:114). In 
fact, the order creating the System of Punishment Redemption and the Civil Code reform that restricted the civilian 
and labour rights of married women were signed during the war, in 1938, by the same Justice Minister, T. 
Domínguez Arévalo (Mendiola, 2010c: 41 – 56). Different gender values that arose in the civil war have been 
analysed by several historians, such as Nash (2009) or Di Febo (2003). The latter underlines the special influence of 
the Catholic church in the shape and rhetoric of Spanish fascist discourse on female domesticity. This discourse, in 
any case, must be understood within labour market formation in the long term, during industrialization, with a clear 
tendency toward masculinisation in Spain from the end of nineteenth century that went unbroken until late 
Francoism (Mendiola, 2002; Borderías and Pérez Fuentes, 2009). 
33 Military geographer Cañete San Juan (1936) had already remarked, before the war began, on the strategic 
importance of the double track on the main railways. At the same time, the war meant a significant increase in 
railway traffic that quite seriously affected the situation of private enterprises; this has been studied by Cayón García 
and Muñoz Rubio (2009).  
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thanks to the deployment of thousands of prisoners, as we have seen in table 1. Even when the war 
was over, this lack of workers continued to pose a problem for swift reconstruction and for progress 
to be made on the double tracks that had already been started, as can be seen in different letters 
between the MZA Company and the Chief of the National Military Service in April 1939, where 
mention is made of “the scarcity of our own workers that we have been able to gather”, and of the 
need for prisoner of war battalions “to get the works done at the fastest rate possible”34.  
In any case, this focus on the supply and demand of labour must involve analysis not 
only at the level of the state, but also at the local and regional levels, since forced labour could be a 
useful means of ensuring the movement of workers to less populated places, where the local 
population could hardly carry out the required tasks; the Pyrenees mountains are a good example of 
this35. As we can see in table 2, the local population was simply insufficient for opening the 
required roads in those mountains, and there is no doubt that enormous efforts and good wages 
would have been needed to ensure the movement of free workers to such isolated places, and for 
them to work and live in such hard conditions.  
Table 2. Ratio between prisoners working on mountain roads (in BDST Battalions) and the civilian 
population of some villages in the Navarran Pyrenees. December, 1940. 
 Civilian population  prisoners  
Ratio 
(prisoners / 
population) 
Lesaka 2285 969 42.4 
Igal 121 592 489.3 
Vidángoz 292 310 106.2 
Roncal 494 274 55.5 
Source: Mendiola, 2010, and Census data 
 
4. A Good Opportunity for Huge Capital Gains 
Another important question for economic historians concerns the profits involved in 
such kinds of repression. Sánchez Albornoz pointed to this challenge when he explained his own 
experience of some months in a Penal Detachment: “The forced labour of the prisoners represented 
                                                 
34 Letter from an engineer of the MZA Company (Compañía Madrid, Zaragoza, Alicante) to the Director (1939, April, 
16th). Fundación de los Ferrocarriles Españoles, Archivo Histórico Ferroviario (AHF), C - 0395 – 005, (Mendiola, 
2011).  
35 The suitability of forced labour for this kind of territory has also been observed in the former Soviet Union. In this 
case, Linden (1997a: 362) expresses very clearly: “it was a very cheap way of mobilizing labour in regions and 
economic sectors where free wage labourers could only have been attracted with great difficulty, (and if successful, 
for very high wages)”. 
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a crude accumulation of capital for the construction companies of Francoism, (...) Business, then, 
at two points, the state and the companies, with a single payer: the prisoner” (2003: 1088 – 1089). 
Moreover, profits resulting from forced labour have formed the subject of research for historians in 
some other countries, like Germany, and it is necessary to distinguish here between profits for 
private enterprises and profits for the state itself, or even for one of its administrations36. 
In order to proceed with this question, we must explain the way in which enterprises, 
and the state itself, obtained prisoners’ labour in Spain. The first decree on forced labour, in May 
1937, regulated this question, and established some criteria that would remain in force, with some 
changes, over the following decades. The first of these is the idea that forced labourers would, 
theoretically, earn some kind of wage. So, the amount of profit would depend on the way the wages 
to be paid were divided up. In this decree we find that prisoners should earn a minimum wage of 2 
pesetas, (0.5 to be paid in hand, and 1.5 that would be designated for his maintenance). If he had a 
wife and children, the family could obtain some extra wages (2 more pesetas for the wife, and 1 
more peseta for each son or daughter under 15 years), although the final amount could never be 
higher than the average wage in the village where the prisoner was working. Some months later, the 
Workers’ Battalions Rule established some changes in this kind of forced labour. In this case, the 
wage was also of 2 pesetas, divided in a different way (1.65 pesetas for maintenance, 0.25 to be 
paid in hand, and 0.10 pesetas for extra needs)37. These rules for prisoners of war were quite similar 
to those for imprisoned men and women, which were included in the order of the Ministry of Justice 
that created the Patronato de Redención de Penas por el Trabajo. In this order the break down of 
the wage mentioned in decree of 1937 is maintained, and it also regulated the use of prisoners by 
private enterprises; in this case the latter “would pay the whole wage to the National Prisons 
Service”. The latter should take responsibility for the maintenance cost of the prisoners, the 
payment to the prisoners’ families, and the remainder should be sent to the State Treasury38.  
                                                 
36  Whatever the reasons that led enterprises to deploy forced labourers (and, as we have seen, historians do not agree 
about these) there is no doubt that during the war most of them obtained huge profits from that kind of workforce 
(for IG Farben, see Hayes, 2001: 325 - 331). On the other hand, the benefits for the state were not only economic. In 
some cases this power was used by some of the institutions, like the SS, to gain political influence thanks to the 
economic control of growing enterprises, like DEST (German Earth and Stone Works, created in 1938) (Jaskot, 
2002: 12 - 22). Moreover, forced labour was also used to strengthen some public administrations, such as the case of 
senior officers of the Justice Ministry, who tried to justify and improve their situation with manipulated statistics 
about the good results of prison labour (Wachsmann, 2004: 233-4). In Spain, differences between different sectors of 
the regime appeared clearly in 1957, during the debate on the suppression of the so-called Militarised Penitentiary 
Colonies, although few prisoners were working in them at that time (Acosta et al, 2005:  94 - 101). 
37 2 peseta were to be spent every month on shoes and material, although this was clearly insufficient, as we can read 
in some military documents  (AGMA, CGG, 2, 155, 10). 
38 BOE, 11 de octubre de 1938, nº 103. Orden del Ministerio de Justicia. There was a great difference between legal 
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Hence, it is easy to see that the State itself was the main beneficiary of that kind of 
repression, on occasions as an employer, and at other times by hiring out workers. In the first case, 
there is little doubt about the benefits provided by this kind of worker: although the state was 
obliged to cover some of the costs of maintaining the working prisoners (such us food, lodging, 
control…), it is obvious that these costs were lower than what the state would have been obliged to 
pay in salaries for the works carried out. In the second case, the state rented out the workforce and 
obtained significant profits from this39. Calculation of the total amount of these profits is another 
goal for economic history, but thanks to some local research that has already been published on the 
Basque mining industry, we know that the total profits for the state were between 50% and 60% of 
the wages paid by enterprises 40.  
On the other hand, the profit margin for private enterprises renting prisoners from the 
state was clearly lower, as these enterprises had to pay the minimum wage of their locality to the 
workers, (except for a part designated for the workers’ maintenance, and a small part to be paid to 
them in hand)41. In any case, enterprises had some special ways for obtaining an extra profit from 
this kind of worker. One of them was to directly ignore the rules about that kind of payment. This 
was more difficult within the System of Punishment Redemption for imprisoned men and women, 
but in other cases, like the prisoners of war in the BB.TT. it was easier. One clear example of this is 
the MZA railway company, which for many months did not obey the regulation about payment for 
the renting of prisoners. It simply ignored this, and when it was required to pay, complaints began to 
be made42. Besides this, Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz reminds us that in some cases (the construction 
of the Valle de los Caídos monastery, for example) companies paid lower wages to prisoners than to 
free labourers, “one third, or more, less than the wage of a free worker” (Sánchez Albornoz, 2003: 
1088). Because of the good opportunities for increasing profits with forced labour, Sánchez 
Albornoz remarks that this kind of capital accumulation can be regarded, in a certain way, as 
                                                                                                                                                                  
provisions and reality in the question of payment to forced workers' families. In the case of Labour Battalions 
depending on the Concentration Camps Inspectorate, oral testimonies tell us this simply never existed (Mendiola 
and Beaumont, 2006). In the case of the post-war System of Punishment Redemption, this was not always 
implemented (Acosta et al, 2005: 214 - 216), and even when it was the local administration often created difficulties 
for the payment to the families, as has been shown for Segovia province in the research of Vega (2005b: 124). 
39 This is also the case of Germany, where different administrations, such as the Wehrmacht, the prisons (Wachsmann, 
2004: 234) and the SS (Allen, 2002:  ; Hayes,  2001: 352) made a profit from renting out forced labourers. 
40 According to the planning previsions of September 1937, it would be 50.3 % of what the companies would pay 
(AGMA, CGG, 1, 57, 42). Real payments in 1938 were quite close to the estimations, with profits of some 55.3% 
for the state (Pastor, 2010: 74). Some other official estimations for the System of Punishment Redemption note that 
65% of the payment made by companies was direct profit for the state (Acosta et al, 2004: 61). 
41 According to the cited decree, the salary should be just the same as the basic salary in the locality where work was 
carried out. 
42 For further details, see Mendiola, (2011). 
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primitive (2010: 86). 
Another way of increasing profits for all those who were managing forced labour 
(private enterprises, army officers or public administration workers) was the opportunity to earn 
quite a lot of money thanks to corruption and the black market in food and clothing, the so-called 
“estraperlo”. In fact, the black market was an economic mechanism for capital accumulation in 
post-war Spain43, and we must bear in mind that the reproduction costs of forced labourers 
represented a good opportunity for private businesses, especially for those administrators or 
companies more interested in obtaining fast private profits than in the efficiency of the tasks carried 
out by prisoners. Thus, this problem held a direct relationship with the accountability of the 
battalions, which had to be reformulated in to cover up the real destination of a great deal of the 
food and clothes that were to be used by prisoners. In this case, oral testimonies are essential to a 
proper understanding of administrative documents, because the latter were seldom managed by 
prisoners44. One special case was that of N. Sánchez Albornoz, who years later became one of the 
most relevant economic historians in Spain, and he also warns us about their lack of veracity: 
“One of my duties consisted in drawing up a daily menu (…) In the months when I elaborated it I never 
had to consult the cook, nor did I set foot in the store. It was a question of a theoretical exercise to meet 
an administrative requirement.” (Sánchez Albornoz, 2003: 1089 -1090). 
 
In any case, if we want to consider the real effect of forced labour, and also its real 
influence on enterprise strategies, we must bear in mind that changes in the labour market, new 
salaries and labour conditions were also fundamental in understanding the extent to which the 
deployment of captive workforce was the best option for the enterprise. If we want to deal in depth 
with what Spoerer has called a cost-benefit analysis, we have to consider the opportunity costs of 
using forced labour, and also the output obtained with it. That is, on the one hand, it is necessary to 
take into account the great fall in real salaries during the war and in the post-war period due to the 
labour policy of Franco's government (Vilar: 2004)45, and, on the other, we have to deal with one of 
                                                 
43 As has been pointed out by González Portilla and Garmendia (2003: 237-260) or Del Arco Blanco (2010: 65 - 78) 
amongst other historians. 
44 Some reports by the Concentration Camp Directorate in 1942 about the lack of credibility of the internal 
accountancy of battalions are analysed in Mendiola and Beaumont (2008: 20 - 25). For a specific black market 
during road construction in the Pyrenees, see Mendiola and Beaumot (2006: 262 – 267), where we can read the 
testimony of Luis Ortiz Alfau, captive in the BDST 38, who worked as a clerk in the battalion. Some other cases can 
be found in the memories of another forced worker in Araba and Navarre (Arenal, 1999: 104 - 110). 
45 According to Vilar (2004: 97 - 105), the post-war decrease in real salaries in Spain was around 30%. In the Basque 
iron industry and mining, real salaries between 1936 and 1941 fell by 55.1%, and 82.4% if we take into account 
black market prices reported by the local Chamber of Commerce (González Portilla and Garmendia, 1988:182). In 
this context, forced labour was not a necessary condition for increasing profit rates during the war and in the post-
war period, in spite of economic stagnation (Portilla and Garmendia, 1998: 134 - 139; Lorenzo Espinosa, 1989. 106 
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the main subjects of debate concerning forced labour, that of productivity levels.   
 
5. Productivity Counts – on Occasion.   
Before dealing with productivity levels in the forced labour system, it is necessary to 
recall that during the first years of Franco´s dictatorship abovementioned rise in profits was 
compatible with a loss of productivity46. In fact, this is the context in which some enterprises and 
the state itself decided to use forced labourers, an option closely related to the choice between 
capital intensive strategies or labour intensive ones47. To put it differently, when was it especially 
profitable for enterprises to use forced labour? After all, productivity also mattered on occasion, and 
this was closely related to some of the essential features of forced labour: such as food and state of 
health, the workers’ political attitude and resistance strategies, choices for training, deployment of 
prisoners in tasks they were not qualified for or accustomed to, the costs of controlling captive 
workers and the qualification of the political or military managers of forced labour48. As we will see 
in the following pages, such kinds of factors led some Spanish enterprises to disregard forced 
workers after the war, and to manage with free ones, while others kept on taking advantage of that 
kind of punitive policy.  
First of all, we must take account of the physical state of extreme weakness amongst 
forced workers49. Hunger appears in almost every oral interview50 and also in some military 
                                                                                                                                                                  
- 107). For a global explanation of labour market changes in post-war Spain, see Soto Carmona (2003). 
46 GDP per hour worked fell (Prados de la Escosura, 2009b: 26) to below pre-war levels, and no improvement in 
labour quality (improvements in labour skill) was achieved until the 1950s (Prados de la Escosura, 2009a: 1079). 
This low productivity, directly related to economic policy, is also one of the keys to understanding the especially 
slow recovery of the Spanish economy after the war (Catalán, 2003, and Martín Aceña, 2006). 
47 Spoerer (2005: 548), for the German case, remarks that companies had little room for manoeuvre in deciding about 
the deployment of forced labour, but considerable scope concerning their working and living conditions, and this 
latter question implied the choice of one or another model. In some companies, like Daimler–Benz, the choice of 
labour intensive processes took place especially where the availability of cheap prisoners seemed endless, before 
1942, and when the perspectives of defeat in the war were not an incentive for fixed capital investments or for 
training prisoners (Gregor, 1998: 176 - 203).  
48 Different estimations have been made about the differential productivity of free and unfree labour in Nazi Germany. 
The Daimler-Benz company calculated that a foreigner worker's productivity was about 70 or 80% of a free 
worker’s (Gregor, 1998: 189 – 190). The internal company figures of the Krupp factories also show these 
differences in November 1942, and management reports explain the lower productivity of Eastern workers as being 
due to a deficient diet and insufficient clothing (Herbert, 1997: 225). In Dortmund, the Mining Authority noted that 
“physical weakness is the main reason for this extraordinary low productivity level amongst Russian prisoners of 
war” (Herbert, 1997: 309). Although wages were different according to ethnic classification, unfree labour was 
reported inside the company as being more expensive and less productive (Herbert: 1997: 299 – 300). In another 
metal industry, nevertheless, (DEW, in Krefeld), productivity levels reached the 100% of German free workers in 
December 1943, mainly thanks to a good training practice and provision of good food rations (Herbert, 1997: 300). 
In any case, this historian remarks that some other aspects, such as the possibility of enforcing the disciplinary 
regime or getting workers for especially hard works (such as installing factories underground) were much easier to 
develop with forced labourers (Herbert, 1997: 306 – 307).  
49 One of the reasons for this deplorable situation, linked to the low incomes received by workers, is that the forced 
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documentation, closely linked to low productivity. For example, the so-called  General Jefe de la 
Junta de Defensa y Armamento de los Pirineos Occidentales wrote a report about the low 
productivity of 38 BDST, working on the road from Oiartzun (Gipuzkoa) to Lesaka (Navarre), in 
1942, explaining that “one of the reasons may be the deficiency of food”51. Besides, the food 
situation, problems of lodging and hygiene, and the lack of clothes appear not only in oral 
interviews, but also in inspection reports of the Army Ministry, such as those for 28 and 29 BDST, 
working on Santiago de Compostela airport, where inspection reports about the prisoners state that 
“a lot of have to go to work completely barefoot”52. 
Apart from this question, it is obvious that ideological factors and resistance 
strategies were also important for understanding the lower productivity of work in captivity. This 
happened during the war, but the will to create difficulties for the regime did not disappear 
following its conclusion, when thousands of prisoners were working on roads or railways. One of 
the later prisoners, Isaac Arenal, working in Jubera (Soria), describes their situation and their 
strategy at work as follows:  
The food was scarce and bad, practically only potatoes and water, but on the contrary they wanted the 
work to be productive, so we tacitly began to carry out passive resistance (…) The truth of the matter is 
that – according to the estimations for production made by the RENFE technicians – the work was only 
advancing at a rate of 25%. (Arenal, 1999: 87-88) 
 
In order to counter this attitude, efforts were sometimes made to increase productivity 
                                                                                                                                                                  
labour system has to internalise all kinds of reproduction costs of the workforce (lodging, food, hygienic 
measures...) that are externalised to families under Fordist capitalism. Although externalised care is proportionally 
cheaper because of the use of unpaid female work inside the family unit, they need a minimum investment (linked to 
the so-called family wage) that was not necessary if reproduction costs are assumed by the state or companies. This 
latter option was cheaper in the short term, and even gave way to extra gains through the black market, but it 
reduced the physical condition of the workforce, and, as a result, the quality of that kind of work, as has been noted 
by different scholars (Carrasco, 2006). A good example is that of the Basque mining industry (in this case the 
enterprises had to take care of these tasks), where there were complaints on more than one occasion that the costs of 
suitable food and lodging were higher than what was stipulated by the cited forced labour regulation and that 
companies were able to provide (Pastor, 2010: 69 - 78). In the same mining enterprises, the shift from “enterprise 
barracks” to family households and the “lodging system” in family households in the early twentieth century was 
also (without dismissing class struggle) a consequence of the need for cheap care labour carried out by women 
(Perez-Fuentes, 2004: 45 – 51). 
50 For the alimentary situation of prisoners of war working in the BDST (contrasting official inspection reports and 
oral testimonies), and especially on mountain roads in the Pyrenees, see Mendiola and Beaumont (2006: 129 – 143). 
More information about this can be found in several research works (Acosta et al, 2004; 217 - 223) and forced 
labourers' memoirs (Arenal, 1999; Barajas, 2009; Padín,2009), in which different strategies emerge to solve the 
problem (night time breakouts, thefts, exchanges of clothes or labour material...) as well as the importance of family 
relief, mainly carried out by women. 
51  Pamplona, 1942, January, 25th. AGMA, Organización Defensiva del Pirineo, Caja 3572, 169.  
52 “Visitas de Inspección: Bones. Trabajadores 2ª, 5ª, 7ª y octava Regiones, Baleares, Canarias y Marruecos”. AGMA, 
Ministerio del Ejército, caja 20.904. For the clothing situation on the Pyrenees roads, see Mendiola and Beaumont, 
2006: 149 – 155).  
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by offering some economic incentives, such as extra earnings.  In the Spanish case, the main 
incentive was overtime, since forced labourers working for private enterprises could obtain some 
additional direct payment in this way, something that has been demonstrated for Cuelgamuros 
monastery or the Lower Guadalquivir Channel53. In any case, this was only put into practice in 
private enterprises, while there is no information on monetary incentives in battalions directed by 
the army. Besides this, the problem of the lack of qualifications and specific incentives for training 
was present in work in captivity. This has been broadly emphasised in the historiography on forced 
labour throughout the twentieth century. According to Herbert, the experience of forced labour in 
World War I showed that “the greater the percentage of skilled labour involved, the more difficult it 
was to achieve high productivity by coercion” (1997: 24). This problem also appeared in Germany 
during Nazi rule as a contradictory factor, because these kinds of incentive or investment in training 
often resulted in lower profits for the employer, mainly in the short term, although it could be useful 
for increasing productivity in the long term.  
Another problem pointed out in several studies on forced labour is the permanent 
tension between control and productivity. Work in captivity involves important costs to ensure that 
workers cannot escape, that is, an investment in fixed capital and in other kinds of workers, such as 
soldiers, prison officers, policemen… Naturally, these costs were only profitable when the number 
of prisoners and the capital gain per worker was high enough to compensate for investment in 
security, and that was closely related to the management of large groups of prisoners. Thus, the 
greater the requirement for decentralization and specialization of workers, the more expensive and 
less profitable the employment of forced labourers became54.  
But the workers’ situation was not the only source of problems for forced labour 
                                                 
53 For the Guadalquivir Channel, (Acosta et al, 2005: 216). Sánchez Albornoz (2010: 79) has remarked that he could 
see the combination of carrot and stick: incentives and threats to send forced labourers back to prison, where they 
had less freedom and could get no extra earnings. Following a comparative model established by Fenoltea (1984), 
Sánchez Albornoz suggests that although legal slavery was not implemented under Francoism, the two main models 
of management of slavery, (one less qualified and more intensive in work, and a second that involved more chances 
of obtaining qualification and extra incentives for forced labour) took place in the Spanish forced labour system, and 
he identifies the System of Redemption with the second (2010: 90 – 91). This need for incentives proved to be 
fundamental in order to increase productivity in the forced labour system in Nazi Germany. Herbert (1997: 300 – 
313) provides several examples of improving productivity thanks to training prisoners, not only in the metal sector, 
but in mining as well, although much less in the latter.  
54 This continuous tension between security and work has also been underlined by researchers on the Gulags or the 
German lagers, and also emerges several times as a serious problem in Spain, where sometimes the difficulties and 
punishment if recaptured after escaping, including immediate execution, acted as a more effective deterrent against 
escapes than the specific quotidian conditions, which were really difficult for the authorities to control. This has 
been pointed out by Olmeda (2009: 99-135), for the Valle de los Caídos Monastery, and by Mendiola and Beaumont 
(2006: 221 - 235), for the Labour Battalions. For similar questions in Nazi Germany, see Herbert (1997: 326 - 358), 
and for the Soviet Gulag system, see Gregory and Lazarev (2007). 
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profitability. In the case of the army, which controlled most of the forced labourers until 1942, in the 
documentation it is easy to find some important problems concerning management and the low 
qualification of officers, and also about the low number of the latter in many works, specially in 
those far from cities or towns, such as mountain villages. Even during the war this problem was 
reported by inspectors, and the situation did not improve in a significant way in its aftermath. On 
the contrary, it was difficult to find qualified officers for that kind of military unit, as we can see in 
several of the inspection reports for 1942, mention is made of different problems leading to a 
situation in which “productivity can be low and barely efficient”, due to the “low culture possessed 
by Chiefs and Captains in general”55, or the “lack of attitude in many of them”56.  
In this context, we can see that some kinds of enterprises were not especially 
interested in the deployment of captives. It is quite significant that the low presence of captive 
workers in some industries tended to disappear in the first years of the post-war period, when the 
workforce shortage was over and low salary policies were consolidated. Moreover, we can also note 
the decline of that kind of repression thanks to the documents of some enterprises that call for the 
replacement of captive workers by free ones. One example of this is given by the mining enterprises 
in Biscay, the majority of which call for the withdrawal of the battalions in a context – the autumn 
of 1939 – of an abundance of workers and a shortage of demand for iron (Pastor, 2010: 78 -80). A 
different case is provided by the railway enterprises, such as the MZA Company. Here, one of the 
reasons that altered the profitability of that kind of worker was the order to obey the regulation on 
the payment for renting prisoners57. Company documentation clearly shows us that captive work 
had a special function when a lot of workers were required, but after the urgent reconstruction 
works were finished there was a serious intention to dispense with them58. One of the best examples 
of this intention is a letter from the director of the company to the Coronel Jefe del Servicio Militar 
de Ferrocarriles, explaining the reasons why they had to request the withdrawal of prisoners from 
the company’s works: 
“It should be borne in mind, besides, that due to the peculiar characteristics of the workers who make up 
                                                 
55  Batallones nº 4, 5, 13, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 33, 45, 53. AGMA, Ministerio del Ejército, caja 20.904. 
56 Informe de la 4ª Región Militar. Batallones nº 19,42,43 y 48. “Visitas de Inspección: Bones. Trabajadores 2ª, 5ª, 7ª y 
octava Regiones, Baleares, Canarias y Marruecos”. AGMA, Ministerio del Ejército, caja 20.904. 
57 AHF, C - 0395 – 005. Different factors for the changing opinion of the MZA company about deploying prisoners are 
explained in depth in Mendiola (2011).  
58 This shows us the complexity of the classic debate about the profitability of forced labour and company preferences 
about it in a context without war. In fact, in several cases differing from the fascist context, such as slavery in the 
southern USA before the civil war (Fogel, 1995 -1974-: 191-209) or the work of prisoners in the same area 
(Lichtenstein, 1996), unfree labour has been reported to be efficient and to achieve huge profits for private 
enterprises.  
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those Battalions, (…) the average productivity per individual is considerably lower than that of a free 
worker, which means that, bearing in mind the working days established by the cited regulations, the works 
have a cost price that is much higher than the corresponding work done on contract (…) ”59 
 
In any case, this kind of strategy should not lead us to think that all enterprises chose 
the same path. As pointed out above, forced labour continued during the 1940s, and several 
construction tasks, such as work on transport infrastructure (airports or railways) or on hydraulic 
works (dams or channels), were carried out by thousands of captive workers, with a close 
connection existing between the Justice Ministry and private companies. This only shows that 
further research is needed, especially for the time when the Concentration Camp Headquarters 
disappeared in 1942, and thousands of prisoners were still deployed by private construction firms to 
carry out public works paid for by the state60.  
Moreover, some of these construction enterprises that made use of forced labourers 
were later to be numbered amongst the most important in Spain. A good example is that of Banús, a 
small family enterprise that began in the Cuelgamuros Monastery and became one of the most 
important construction enterprises in the tourist area known as the Coast of the Sun. In addition, 
two of the larger construction enterprises in 1977, Entrecanales and Dragados y Construcciones, 
had used forced labourers during the war or in the post-war period, and even today form part of two 
powerful groups, Acciona and ACS, respectively61.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The deployment of forced labour in Franco's Spain must be understood in a dynamic 
perspective, with special attention paid to the different factors that encouraged its use or made it 
difficult, such as the political and economic conjuncture and enterprise strategies.  Without ignoring 
its political function, in this article I have focused on economic variables to provide a better 
explanation of its changing logic. Nonetheless, we should not forget that this repressive practice 
must be understood within the context of fascist rule in Spain and the state’s intervention in the 
labour market, which was characterized by strict regulation and by one of the most repressive 
attacks on the labour movement in Western Europe.  
                                                 
59 AHF, C - 0395 – 005. Carta del 12 de enero de 1940 del Director de MZA al Coronel Jefe del Servicio Militar de 
Ferrocarriles. Further explanation about changes in MZA labour policy can be found in Mendiola (2011).  
60 Research on the Lower Guadalquivir Channel (Acosta et al, 2005), and there is some further research on another 
important construction project, that of the Cuelgamueros Monastery (Olmeda, 2009), or on railway infrastructure 
(Olaizola, Quintero …) .  
61 Entrecanales y Távora worked, using prisoners, in the renovation of the sewer system in Seville during the civil war 
(Martínez y Rodríguez Molina, 2007: 155). For works carried out by Dragados y Construcciones see Acosta et al 
(2005: 65 – 75). For the current situation of these construction companies, see Recio (2009: 135 – 143 and 148 - 
149).  
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Besides these political factors, it is necessary to note that the deployment of forced 
labour during the war is closely related to the problem of workforce lacks in strategic sectors, such 
as industry, mining or transport infrastructure, and complementary military tasks. Besides, this 
system offered the possibility of increasing the profit margins of some enterprises, and was used 
with a political purpose, the disciplinary treatment of the politically opposed population.  
 
In any case, some of the peculiarities of the Spanish Civil War explain the limits of 
this kind of punishment. On the one hand, workforce demand was not very high, due to the 
disarticulation of the pre-war productive network and the lack of economic dynamism. On the other, 
the inelasticity of the supply of forced labour (due to the limited numbers of prisoners of war), also 
made the expansion of this system difficult, because the costs of workforce reproduction had to be 
assumed by the company or the state. Besides, the lower productivity of forced labourers was 
evident, due to different factors (lack of qualification, physical weakness, ideological resistance …).  
 
Nevertheless, the end of the war did not bring the immediate dismantling of the 
forced labour institutions. Although some changes were made, extra-judicial forced labour within 
the administrative structure of the concentration camps was maintained until December 1942 with 
the new BDST. Together with imprisoned men and women, almost 70,000 forced labourers were 
used during that year as a cheap workforce suitable for the special needs of immediate 
reconstruction or for building military fortresses. Besides, it proved especially useful for ensuring 
the mobility of workers to places where there was a special workforce lack (borders, mountains …).  
 
After 1942, in any case, the concentration camp structure was dismantled, and forced 
labour became more and more scarce. This was linked to low workforce demand and economic 
stagnation, and to changes in labour market policies, with longer working days and lower wages 
that ensured growing profits and higher productivity for companies on the “free” labour market. 
Besides, in the case of the militarily-managed workers’ battalions (BDST), internal inspection 
reports clearly showed the low qualification and frequent corruption of many army officers, which 
resulted in especially low productivity in these battalions. In any case, although the figures were 
declining, thousands of prisoners were still deployed from 1942 onwards in several public works, 
helping to increase the profit margins of companies and the state itself, especially in labour 
intensive sectors (urban construction, railway, dams...).  
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It is therefore evident that new research will be needed to obtain better knowledge of 
a reality that has remained invisible in Spanish society and historiography for too long. Access to 
new documentation, mainly enterprise archives, will be crucial for advancing in our understanding 
of a complex economic reality, where political punishment and production aims were combined in 
different forms, according to changing circumstances. In any case, we cannot forget that apparently 
banal calculations of costs and profits, made by the state and private enterprises, amounted to much 
more than this, meaning life and death for thousands of captive workers. Once again, the banality of 
evil.  
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